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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the effect of population aging on economic performance in an 
overlapping-generations model with international migration. Fertility is endogenized so 
that immigrants and natives can have different fertility rates. Fertility is an important 
determinant to the tax burden of social security since it affects the quantity and quality 
of future tax payers. We find that introducing immigrants into the economy can reduce 
the tax burden of social security. If life expectancy (or the replacement ratio) is high 
enough, the growth rate of GDP per worker for an economy with international 
migration will be higher than for a closed economy. Regarding migration policies, our 
numerical results indicate that economic growth rate of GDP per worker will first 
decrease then increase as the flow of immigrants increases. Increasing the quality of 
immigrants will enhance economic growth. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past century longevity has steadily increased in countries which have 
experienced economic growth. The upward trend of life expectancy in Canada, France, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. during the period from 1980 to 2005 is 
presented in Figure 1a. One implication of longevity growth  is that more resources must 
be devoted to supporting the elderly, and governments have often raised social security 
expenditures. Figure 1b shows that the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP increased 
along with life expectancy in Canada, France, Japan, United Kingdom and U.S.A. over the 
period from 1980 to2005.1 
However, for most industrialized countries a decline in mortality is accompanied by a 
reduction in fertility over the course of development. The graying of many countries’ 
populations has led many to worry about the future tax burden of social security.  In short, 
the concern is that expenditures on old-age entitlements will continue to grow even as 
there are fewer young people available to contribute to the tax base.  
There is a huge amount of literature devoted to the increasing social security burden 
caused by aging populations and possible solutions to this problem. These studies can be 
classified into two categories. The first line of research focuses on the sustainability of a 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system or on possible reforms to the social security system. The 
interaction of public investment in education, social security and growth is investigated by 
Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) and Pecchenino and Pollard (2002). Based on a two-sector 
growth model, Zhang et al. (2001) compare the effects of mortality decline on long-run 
growth under funded and unfunded social security schemes. Recently, Groezen et al. 
(2003) and Fenge and Meier (2005) suggest that the burden of social security can be 
mitigated by using child allowances. With child allowances, the cost of raising children 
                                                 
1   Data source for Figures 1a and 1b: World Development Indicator, World Bank. 
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becomes lower and parents will have stronger incentives to have more children.2 
 The second category of previous research considers the problem of increasing social 
security burden in an economy with international migration. This research line 
demonstrates that introducing immigrants can alleviate the increasing burden of social 
security for developed countries. Razin and Sadka (1999) show that even introducing low-
skilled immigrants who are often beneficiaries of the welfare state into an economy can be 
beneficial to all income and all age groups. With a dynamic set-up, adult immigrants share 
the burden of social security with natives upon their migration into the host country. 
Although these immigrants will create a new welfare burden in the future, the burden will 
be shared by newly introduced immigrants as long as the economy is ever-lasting. By 
using the data from Current Population Survey (CPS) and Public Use Microdata Sample 
(PUMS), Lee and Miller (2000) project the fiscal impact of immigrants and their 
descendents. They find that the net present value contributed by an immigrant is always 
positive to the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI).  
In this paper, we follow the second line of research to revisit the issue of an 
increasing social security burden in an economy with international migration. Besides 
examining the impact of introducing immigrants on the tax burden of a social security 
program, we also explore immigration’s effects on key macroeconomic variables such as 
fertility, educational investment and economic growth. There are two major differences 
between this paper and existing research. First, while previous literature tends to treat 
fertility as an exogenous variable, fertility decisions are endogenized in this paper. 3 It is 
now well-known that parents’ decisions about fertility and the educational investments 
                                                 
2   However, this view is challenged by Mochida (2005) who argues that when uncertain lifetime is 
incorporated into the model, introducing child allowances does not necessarily increase fertility because it 
may induce a higher tax rate. With lower after-tax income and increasing life expectancy, adults may choose 
to work more and have fewer children in order to save more for their post-retirement consumption. 
3   For example, Razin and Sadka (1999) and Doi et al. (2006) develop models with exogenous fertility 
rate to study the immigration issue for a host country. 
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of their offspring are interdependent (Becker et al., 1990).4 Ehrlich and Lui (1991) 
demonstrate that if old agents are dependent on their offspring for material support, a 
decline in the mortality will raise parents’ expected rate of investment in the human 
capital of their children and induce a corresponding reduction in fertility (the quality-
quantity trade-off of children). The increase in the educational investment will in turn 
raise the long-run growth rate. 
Second, we assume that the level of immigrants’ human capital can be different 
from that of natives. Different levels of human capital cause immigrants and natives to 
make different choices about fertility and investment in their children’s education. 
This change in human capital accumulation will then affect economic growth. 
Furthermore, fertility matters when considering an economy with heterogeneous 
agents, because it will also affect the future population structure and labor force. Both 
population structure and labor force are important determinants of the burden of social 
security.  
We develop an overlapping-generations model of social security within which 
adults make decisions about consumption, fertility and investment in their children’s 
education. In order to compare the impact of longevity in an economy with 
international migration with that in a closed economy, we first consider a simple, 
closed economy with a PAYG social security program.5 We show that a balanced-
growth-path (BGP) equilibrium exists in such an economy. An increase in life 
expectancy will increase the tax rate necessary for social security and reduce after-tax 
                                                 
4   A wealth of studies exists on the trade-off of fertility and educational investments of children. Among all, 
see de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004). 
5   An economy with social security program and endogenous fertility is also studied by Zhang et al. (2003) 
and Zhang and Zhang (2003). However, in their studies, social security payments are treated as endogenous 
variables. The impact of choices of fertility and educational investment on the future social security payments 
are taken into consideration when parents make their decisions on the quality and quantity of children. In this 
paper, we follow Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) and Groezen et al. (2003) by assuming that social security 
payment is treated as an exogenous variable when adults make optimal decisions.  
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income. Reduced after-tax income will cause adults to have fewer children (income 
effect). But the lower after-tax wage rate will also reduce the time cost of raising 
children and will motivate adults to have more children (substitution effect). We find 
that the income effect will dominate the substitution effect and an increase in life 
expectancy will reduce fertility and investment in children’s education. This will slow 
economic growth. On the other hand, longer life expectancy will induce more savings 
which increases economic growth. If life expectancy is high enough, the former effect 
will dominate the latter, and increased life expectancy will retard economic growth. 
We also find that an increase in social security payments will raise fertility and 
decrease educational expenditure if the degree of altruism is sufficiently low. Hence, 
under this condition an increase in the social security payment will lower economic 
growth. 
Next, we consider an economy with international immigrants. In order to study the 
impact of migration policy regarding the quality of immigrants, we assume that 
immigrants possess a different level of human capital from natives. Our consideration of 
the heterogeneity among immigrants and natives is closely related to Storesletten (2000). 
A life-cycle model is developed by Storesletten (2000) to study if a reform of immigration 
policy can reduce the social security problem caused by the aging of the baby boom 
generation. He emphasized the characteristics of immigrants by assuming that immigrants 
are differentiated in age at the time of immigration and by their legal status. In his study, 
however, fertility and investment in children’s education are not endogenous. 
The existence of heterogeneous agents makes the model more complicated, so we 
simulate the model to quantify the effects of migration policy. We find that introducing 
low-skilled immigrants into the economy can reduce the social security tax rate since 
immigrants have higher fertility. A migration policy which allows the amount of 
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immigrants whose human capital level is 94% of natives to be 2% of the population of 
natives in every period can lower the social security tax rate by 1.83% in the long run. 
If life expectancy (or the replacement ratio) is high enough, the growth rate of GDP 
per worker for an economy with migration will be higher than for a closed economy, 
provided that the gap of human capital between immigrants and natives is not large 
and the flow of immigrants is small.  
Comparing the numerical results under endogenous-fertility and exogenous-
fertility models, we find that there will be biased estimation for the effects of life 
expectancy on fertility, social security tax rate and economic growth if one does not 
consider the endogenous change in fertility. The benefits brought by the immigration 
policy would be exaggerated for an ageing economy if fertility is not endogenized. We 
also study the impact of migration policies by changing the quantity and quality of 
immigrants. Our numerical results show that the economic growth rate will first 
decrease and then increase as more workers are allowed to migrate into the host 
country. On the other hand, increasing the quality of immigrants will enhance 
economic growth. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
describe the basic settings of our model in a closed economy with a PAYG social 
security scheme. In Section 3, we develop an economy with international migration. In 
Section 4, we carry out numerical analysis to determine the effects of longevity, social 
security payments and migration policies on economic performance. The conclusions 
drawn from this study are presented in the final section. 
2.  THE MODEL  
As a benchmark, we first examine the effects of social security in a closed economy 
comprised of homogeneous agents. We consider an infinite-horizon, discrete time 
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overlapping-generations model within which agents live for three periods - childhood, 
adulthood (parenting) and old age. Agents always survive from childhood to adulthood, 
but their survival from adulthood to old age is uncertain. Each period covers 
approximately 30 years. 
All decisions are made in adulthood, with adults deciding how many children they 
will have, how much to invest in their children’s education, how much to consume, 
and how much they should save for their old age. When making such decisions, these 
adults face an uncertain probability ( )1,0(p ) of survival from adulthood to old age. 
There is a PAYG social security system implemented in this economy. In each period, 
the government levies a tax on adult wage income and transfers the tax revenue to the 
surviving old agents. Old agents do not work and consume their savings from the 
previous period, the returns from mutual funds, and social security benefits. 
2.1  Households 
Children born in period t  spend all of their time accumulating additional human 
capital. The human capital accumulation function depends on the educational 
investment made by their parents ( te ) and parental human capital ( th ), and is given by: 
                          11 ttt hBeh ,                                                 (1) 
where 0B  represents the productivity of human capital accumulation and )1,0(  
is the elasticity of children’s human capital with respect to educational investment.6 
We assume that the human capital accumulation function displays diminishing returns 
to scale in educational investments and constant returns to scale in parental human 
capital and educational investments in order to generate endogenous growth. 
Following de la Croix and Doepke (2003), we assume that adults in period t  care 
                                                 
6    The Cobb-Douglas formation of the human capital accumulation function has been widely used in 
the literature on human capital; see, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).  
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about the number of children ( tn ), their children’s human capital ( 1th ), their adult 
consumption ( tc ), and their old age consumption ( 1td ). The expected lifetime utility 
function, which is identical for all adults, is defined as: 
11 lnlnln   ttttt hndpcU   ,                                    (2) 
where the parameter 0  reflects the degree of altruism amongst parents, and p   
represents the probability that adults will survive to old age.  
In each period, agents are endowed with one unit of time. They spend tl  units of 
time on work to earn wages ( tw ) and the rest of time on raising children. We assume 
that each child consumes a fixed fraction ( )1,0(q ) of their parent’s unit of time. 
Hence, the time constraint for adults is: 
                                                  1 tt qnl .                                                          (3) 
Adults pay income tax with rate t  to the government and spend the after-tax 
income on consumption, investments in children’s education, and savings ( ts ). The 
budget constraint for adults is: 
 tttttttt hlwnesc )1(  .                                          (4) 
Following Yarri (1965) and Blanchard (1985), we assume that each adult’s savings 
are deposited into mutual funds, which are invested in the capital market. Let )1( 1 tr  
denote the gross rate of return in the capital market; then the gross rate of return for those 
surviving to old age is: 
                                                     
p
rt
t
1
1
1
1 
  . 
The budget constraint for an old agent is therefore: 
                                     111 )1(   tttt Msd  ,                                           (5) 
where 1tM  denotes the social security transfer in period 1t . Combining Eqs. (4) and (5) 
gives us the inter-temporal budget constraint: 
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1
1
1
1
1
)1(
1 



 t
t
tttttt
t
t
t
Mhlwnedc  .                              (6) 
Government taxes labor incomes to finance social security. Let tN  denote the 
adult population in period t . The budget constraint for the government in period 1t  
is: 
                                         111111   ttttttt hlNwMpN  .                                         (7) 
2.2  Production 
Using physical capital ( tK ) and effective labor ( tttt hlNL  ), output ( tY ) is produced 
by the following production function: 
                                                              1ttt LAKY ,                                                    (8) 
where 0A  represents the total factor productivity and )1,0(  is the share of 
physical capital income to the output.  
Assuming perfectly competitive factor markets, the gross rate of the return on 
physical capital and the real wage rates are: 7 
   1 11111 ttt LKAr ,                                                 (9) 
  ttt LKAw )1( .                                                (10) 
Let ttt NKk /  denote the physical capital per worker. Then the output per 
worker ( ttt NYy / ) can be expressed by 
                                                             1)( tttt hlAky .                                              (11) 
2.3  The Economy 
We are now able to define the equilibrium of the economy. Given the probability of 
survival ( p ), the initial values of physical and human capital { 1K , 1h } and the initial 
                                                 
7    We assume that physical capital completely depreciates after one period (30 years).  
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value of population 1N , an equilibrium comprises of sequences of { tK , th , tN }, the 
factor prices and tax rate { tr , tw , t } and households’ decision rules { tc , 1td , ts , te , 
tn } such that: 
1. Given { 1tr , tw }, households will make their decisions by maximizing their 
utility subject to budget constraints; 
2. Firms choose tK  and tL  to maximize profits;  
3.    Markets clear; 
4.  Government runs the public pension system as a PAYG-scheme with the 
balanced budget constraint (Eq. (7) holds). 
Adults will maximize Eq. (2), subject to Eqs. (1), (3) and (6). The optimal choices 
of tc , 1td , tn  and te  are: 
)1)(1(1
)1(
1
1




t
tttt
t p
M
p
hwc 

,                                    (12)        
                      ttt cpd )1( 11    ,                                              (13) 
tttt
t
t hwpq
M
pq
n
)1)(1)(1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
1




 


 ,                      (14) 
                            



1
)1( ttt
t
hwqe .                                               (15) 
The capital market clearing condition implies that:  
                                                   ttt sNK 1 .                                                       (16) 
The replacement ratio ( a ) which is considered as a policy parameter is defined as the 
ratio of social security payment to the current wage income. 8 That is:  
   
ttt
t
hlw
Ma  .                                                            (17) 
Combining Eqs. (7) and (17), we can derive that: 
                                               
tt
t
t n
pa
N
paN 


1
1 .                                                (18) 
                                                 
8    The same definition of social security benefits is used by Pecchenino and Pollard (2002).  
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Eq. (18) shows that the tax rate needs to be adjusted in every period in order to keep 
the amount of social security benefit to be proportional to the adults’ wage income. It 
also indicates that the higher fertility rate in the current period can help mitigate the tax 
burden for the social security in the next period.  
Combining Eqs. (8), (9), (10) and (16), we can express the social security 
payments as: 
                                       

p
sr
M tttt
11
1
)1)(1( 

 .                                         (19) 
Substituting Eq. (19) into Eqs. (5) and (12)-(14), the optimal decisions on savings 
and fertility are: 
)1)(1()1(
)1(
1 



t
ttt
t p
hwps ,                                (20) 
                                
)]1)(1()1([
)]1()[1(
1
1






t
t
t pq
n .                              (21) 
In Appendix 1, we show that fertility is constant over time. Then Eqs. (3) and (18) 
indicate that labor input and tax rate are also constant. That is, nnt  , llt  ,  t  
for all t . In the following proposition, we prove that a unique BGP equilibrium exists 
in the economy.  
Proposition 1.    For a closed economy with homogeneous agents, there exists a 
unique BGP equilibrium. Furthermore, along the BGP , the growth factor is: 
                                        )1(1
1
1
*
])1([)(
)1()()1)(1( 



 








B
lpAqg .              
Proof:  See Appendix 1.  
We concentrate our study on the BGP equilibrium. Define 
ttt
t
t hlw
e  to 
represent the ratio of educational investment per child to labor income. Using Eqs. (3) 
and (15), we can derive a function t  that remains constant over time: 
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 
 

)1)(1(
)1(
qn
q
t  .                                       (22) 
In the following Proposition, we examine the impacts of social security reform 
(that is, changes in the replacement ratio) on the fertility rate, the ratio of educational 
expenditure to labor income, and the growth factor. 
Proposition 2.  A rise in the replacement ratio will increase fertility. Furthermore, it 
will reduce the ratio of educational expenditure per child to labor income and the 
growth factor if ߪ ൏ ߠ/ሺ1 െ ߠሻ. 
Proof:       See Appendix 2. 
If the government raises the replacement ratio, the social security tax rate will be 
higher (Eq. (18)). The increase in the tax burden of social security will cause an 
income effect and a substitution effect. The lower after-tax labor income will motivate 
adults to work more and have fewer children (income effect). It will also reduce the 
educational investment. However, due to the lower after-tax wage rate, the opportunity 
cost of raising children become lower and adults will work less, have more children 
(substitution effect) and spend less on each child’s education. As the replacement ratio 
increases, the substitution effect will dominate income effect and parents will have 
more children and invest less on children’s education.9 
Since parents spend less time on work, labor income will be lower. Because both 
the educational investment and labor income will decrease, the impact of an increase 
in the replacement ratio on the ratio educational expenditure to labor income depends 
on which factor dominates. If the degree of altruism among parents is low enough 
(such that ߪ ൏ ߠ/ሺ1 െ ߠሻ), then parents do not care their children that much and the 
decrease in educational investment dominates the decrease in labor income and the 
                                                 
9    Our result is different from Zhang and Zhang (2004) since we do not consider bequests. If bequests 
are included in the model, an increase in the replacement ratio will have ambiguous impacts on fertility.  
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ratio of education expenditure per child to labor income will become lower. The lower 
educational investment will slow the accumulation of human capital. Thus, an increase 
in the replacement ratio will reduce the rate of economic growth. 
Next, we consider the effects of life expectancy on economic performance. 
Proposition 3.  An increase in life expectancy will reduce both fertility and the ratio 
of education expenditure per child to labor income. Moreover, an increase in life 
expectancy will slow economic growth if life expectancy is higher than the critical 
value 
~
p , where ])()1)[(())(1(
~~~
2   ppp . 
Proof:      See Appendix 3. 
An increase in life expectancy will increase the incentive for adults to save. 
Moreover, when life expectancy increases, the social security tax must increase to 
finance the increasing social security expenditure. The income effect caused by the 
increasing tax rate will dominate the substitution effect and fertility will decrease. 
Because of the increase in the incentive to save and the decrease in after-tax income, 
parents will invest less in each child’s education and the ratio of educational 
expenditure to labor income will decrease. This will retard economic growth. On the 
other hand, savings themselves are beneficial to physical capital accumulation and 
therefore growth. The impact of life expectancy on growth depends on which effect 
dominates. If life expectancy is high enough, the effect of lower human capital 
accumulation will dominate the effect of higher physical capital accumulation due to 
the diminishing returns of physical capital. Then an increase in life expectancy will 
lower the economic growth rate. In Appendix 3, we show that this critical value of life 
expectancy 
~
p is such that ])()1)[(())(1(
~~~
2   ppp . 
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Using parameter values calibrated in the next section, the implications of 
Proposition 3 are shown in Figure 2. When life expectancy increases from 0.2 to 1, the 
tax rate will increase while fertility and the ratio of educational investment to labor 
income will decrease. Furthermore, as life expectancy increases, the growth rate will 
first increase and then decrease. 
3.  INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
In this section, we consider an economy with international migration. We assume that 
before period one, the economy, comprised by homogenous agents with human capital 
1
th , is closed and moves along the BGP. In order to incorporate the difference in 
productivity between immigrants and natives in our model, we allow the level of 
human capital of immigrants to be different from natives in a closed economy. In 
period one, the economy opens for adult immigrants with human capital 12 tt hh   and 
0 . Note that the immigrants can be low-skilled or high-skilled workers depending 
on 1  or 1 .  
Let 1tN  and 
2,H
tN  respectively denote the native adult population of type 1 and 2 
agents. Then 2,1 Htt
H
t NNN   represent the total adult population of natives in the 
host country. In each period, there will 2,FtN  foreign adults with human capital 
2
th  
migrate into the host country. We assume that Ht
F
t NN 2,  with )1,0( . Then the 
adult population of type-2 agents migration occurs is 2,2,2 Ft
H
tt NNN   and the total 
adult population after migration is 21 ttt NNN  . The dynamics of the adult 
population for any 1t  is governed by: 
                                       Htttttt NnNnNN 1
2211
1                      
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))(1( 2211 tttt nNnN   .                                             (23) 
We use 1t  and 2t  to respectively denote the respective ratios of type-1 and 2 
workers to the total adult population in period. Hence, 121  tt . The dynamics of 
respective ratios of type-1 and 2 workers to the total population of workers follow: 
                              
))(1( 2211
11
1
1
tttt
tt
t nn
n

   ,    
1
1
2
1 1   tt .                           (24) 
Let itc , 
i
td 1 , 
i
tn  and 
i
te  represent adult consumption, old age consumption, 
fertility and educational investment for type- i  workers. For each type of adults, they 
will maximize Eq. (2), subject to Eqs. (1), (3) and (6) based on their human capital. 
Given the human capital of each type agents ( ith ), the optimal decisions of 
i
tc , 
i
td 1 , 
i
tn  
and ite  are given by Eqs. (12)-(15). Substituting Eq. (15) into Eq. (1), we can compute 
the level of human capital of the children for each type of agents as: 
                                                  11 1 1
)1(
t
tt
t h
wqBh


 



 ,       
                                           1 11112 1 1 )1(  




 tttttt hhhwqBh 
  . 
Therefore, the level of human capital of children with foreign parents will equal 
the level of human capital of immigrants in the next period. This implies that for any 
period 1t , there are two types of agents with different levels human capital ( ith , 
2,1i ). We assume that children of immigrants, born after their parents immigrated, 
are regarded as natives. Thus, the adult population of type-2 agents is composed by 
natives with foreign ancestors and immigrants.  
The average human capital in period  t   is: 
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                                                  2211 ttttt hhH  .                                                    (25) 
Let itl  denote working time for type- i  workers. Then the effective labor in period t  is:  
                                             )( 222111 tttttttt lhlhNL  .                                             (26)  
The capital market clearing condition is: 
                                             22111 ttttt sNsNK  .                                                (27) 
The factor prices are represented by Eqs. (9) and (10). All surviving old agents 
will receive the same social security payments proportional to the average wage 
income. That is:  
                               )( 2 1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
111   tttttttt lhlhawM .                                (28) 
The balanced budget constraint for the government is: 
                                                11111   tttttt LNwMpN  .                                          (29)  
Eq. (28) together with Eq. (29) determine the tax rate: 
          
))(1( 22111 tttt
t nn
pa
  .                                         (30) 
The optimal fertility choices for type-1 and 2 adults can be solved by using Eqs. 
(5), (9), (10), (12)-(14), (27) and (29): 
 1
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)1)(1()1()1(
)]()1()1)(1()1()[1(




t
tttt
t ppq
ppn 

,        (31) 
 1
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)}()1(])1)(1()1([){1(



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t
tttt
t ppq
ppn 

.      (32) 
Notice that 
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
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t
ttt
tt ppq
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.                  (33) 
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Eq. (33) implies that  21 tt nn   if and only if 1  and vice versa. Because for parents 
with low human capital, the time cost of raising children is lower, then they will tend 
to have more children than those with high human capital 
4.  NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT 
Due to the complexity of the model, in this section we simulate our model in order to 
quantify the influence of migration on economic performance. Before proceeding with 
our computational work, we calibrate the parameters used in the model to match U.S. 
data. The calibration of parameter values is based upon economic performance along 
the BGP under a closed economy. All of the following calibrated parameter values are 
referred to as benchmark model parameter values. 
4.1  Calibration 
We set the share of physical capital income to the output ( ) to 0.3. The parameters A  
and B  are respectively set at 14.998 and 2.272 so that the annual growth rate is 2% 
and the initial ratio of physical capital to human capital is 1 (Kendrick, 1976).  
Haveman and Wolfe (1995) suggest that raising a child will cost approximately 15 
percent of parents' time endowment. Hence, q  is assigned to 0.15. The total fertility 
rate of U.S. in recent years is about 2 children per woman, so we choose the degree of 
altruism   used in the utility function to be 0.35 in order to make the representative 
agent have about 1 child per person. In 2005, life expectancy is 78 years in U.S. Since 
one period equals 30 years in this model, we set p =0.6 to replicate the actual 
circumstance. For human capital accumulation function, we follow Chen (2005) to set 
  equal to 0.2. 
The remaining parameter to be calibrated for is the replacement ratio. Based on 
Pecchenino and Pollard (2002), we set the replacement ratio ( a ) to 0.4. Given these 
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benchmark model parameter values, the annual growth rate is 2%, the fertility rate is 
1.070, the ratio of educational investment to labor income is 3.466% and the tax rate is 
22.422% along the BGP equilibrium for a closed economy. 
When an economy opens for international migration, there are two important 
parameters regarding the quality and quantity of immigrants to be considered. 
Regarding the quality of immigrants, we follow the literature of human capital and use 
years of schooling to measure the level of human capital. Comparing the years of 
education of natives and immigrants of USA, Borjas (1993) finds that on average, 
immigrants have 11.859 years of schooling which is 0.8 years fewer than natives. This 
implies that immigrants are low-skilled workers and we set the parameter   to 
11.859/(11.859+0.8)=94%. Regarding the quantity of immigrants, we first assign 
%2  so that the number of migrants is only a small fraction of the native adult 
population. The assumption that the economy opens for international migration in the 
first period implies that 98.0
1
11
1   . Given that our main goal is to study the 
influence of the migration, we will conduct sensitivity analysis on   and  .  
4.2 Results  
We begin our analysis by comparing the effects of life expectancy on long-run (tenth 
period) economic performance for an economy with and without international 
migration.10 Details of the long-run impact of migration on average fertility, average 
ratio of educational expenditure to labor income, tax rate and the annual growth rate 
are presented in Table 1, with columns 2 and 3 providing the simulation results under 
benchmark model parameter values. Comparing these two columns, we find that a 
small amount of immigrants can have significant effects since introducing immigration 
                                                 
10  In this paper, we do not consider the transitional dynamics and focus on the results in the long run. 
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can lower the tax rate by 1.83% and fertility by 0.14% and increase the ratio of 
educational investment to labor income by 0.5%. The growth rate is reduced by 0.11% 
due to the introduction of low-skilled immigrants. 
<Table 1 is inserted about here> 
The effects of raising longevity from 0.2 (life expectancy is 66 years) to 1 (life 
expectancy is 90 years) on economic performance are shown in Figure 2. It shows that 
with an increase in longevity, the social security burden becomes heavier and the after-
tax income decreases. Hence, adults will spend more time on work and both 
educational expenditure and fertility will fall. Comparing the tax rate in an economy 
with migration with that in a closed economy, we find that introducing immigration 
will lower the social security tax rate and the spread of the tax rate widens as the life 
expectancy goes up. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 display the effects for 1p  under 
two different economies. Table 1 shows that the gap between the tax rates under a 
closed economy and an economy with migration increases from 0.41% to 0.7% when 
p  increases from 0.6 to 1. 
<Figure 2 is inserted about here> 
For both economies, the economic growth will first increase then decrease as the 
life expectancy increases. Note that immigration changes the skill composition of the 
economy. Eq. (33) indicates that with the introducing of low-skilled immigrants, 
immigrants have higher fertility rate than natives. This implies that the proportion of 
type-2 workers who possess lower human capital to the total adult population will 
increase over time. Figure 2 shows that the annual growth rate in an economy with 
migration is lower than that in a closed economy when life expectancy is low due to 
the introduction of low-skilled immigrants. However, if life expectancy is high enough, 
the growth rate in an economy with migration will exceed than that in a closed 
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economy because the introduction of immigrants can mitigate the social security tax 
burden and adults can invest more in their children’s education.  
Numerical Result 1.  Introducing low-skilled immigrants can mitigate the tax burden of 
social security, with a larger effect as life expectancy increases. When life expectancy is 
low, the growth rate in an economy with migration is lower than that in a closed 
economy due to the low human capital of immigrants. However, the growth rate in an 
economy with migration will be higher if life expectancy is high enough, provided that 
the gap of human capital between immigrants and high-skilled natives is not too large, 
and the flow of immigrants is small. 
Next, we consider the effects of changes in the replacement ratio. The results are 
shown in Figure 3.  As the replacement ratio increases, the tax rate will increase while 
fertility will decrease as demonstrated in Proposition 2. Due to the quality-quantity 
trade-off in children, educational expenditure will decrease and this will in turn lower 
the growth rate. Comparing the economic performance of an economy with migration 
with a closed economy, we find that the introduction of immigrants can help reduce 
the tax burden, with a larger effect as the replacement ratio increases. The average 
fertility is lower and the average ratio of educational investment to labor income is 
higher in an economy with migration. The growth rate of an economy with migration 
is lower when the replacement ratio is small due to the lower level of immigrants’ 
human capital. However, if the replacement ratio is large enough, the growth rate for 
an economy with migration will be higher because of higher educational investments. 
The last two columns of Table 1 reveal the effects for 9.0a  under a closed economy 
and an economy with migration.  
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Numerical Result 2.  Introducing low-skilled immigrants can mitigate the tax burden of 
social security, with a larger effect as the replacement ratio increases. If the gap in 
human capital between immigrants and natives is not too large and the flow of 
immigrants is small, the economic growth rate in an economy with migration will be 
higher than that in a closed economy when the replacement ratio is sufficiently high. 
<Figure 3 is inserted about here> 
4. 3 Endogenous v.s. Exogenous Fertility 
To demonstrate the important role of endogenous fertility on the effect of social 
security burden and economic growth, Figures 4 and 5 present the results of exogenous 
fertility with varying life expectancy and replacement ratio, respectively. The 
exogenous fertility rates of type-1 and type-2 agents are set to equal the fertility rates 
under benchmark (݌ ൌ 0.6, ܽ ൌ 0.4). The resulting fertility rate for type-1 agents is 
1.067 and for type-2 agents is 1.079.  
<Figure 4 is inserted about here> 
Recall that the Numerical Result 1 demonstrates that the average fertility 
decreases with an increase in the life expectancy in the endogenous-fertility model. 
Thus, when the life expectancy is lower than 0.6, the endogenous-fertility model will 
generate higher average fertility as shown in Figure 4. This induces lower social 
security tax rate and a higher ratio of educational investment to labor income. 
Although the ratio of educational investment to labor income increases, the ratio of 
educational investment to human capital decreases because an increase in the labor 
force reduces the wage rate. Therefore, the economic growth rate is lower in the 
endogenous-fertility model. When life expectancy is higher than 0.6, its effects on 
average fertility, social security tax rate and the ratio of educational investment to 
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labor income in the endogenous- and exogenous-fertility models will be reversed. 
However, the economic growth rate is still lower in the endogenous-fertility model. 
This comparison implies that when studying the effects of migration policy, there will 
be biased estimation of its effects on fertility, tax rate and economic growth if fertility 
is not endogenized. Especially, the economic growth rate may be over-predicted and 
the benefits migration policy may be exaggerated.  
<Figure 5 is inserted about here> 
Recall that the Numerical Result 2 demonstrates that the average fertility 
increases with an increase in the replacement ratio in the endogenous-fertility model. 
Thus, the endogenous-fertility model will generate lower average fertility when the 
replacement ratio is lower than 0.4 as shown in Figure 5. Then the social security tax 
rate will be higher and the ratio of educational investment to labor income and the 
economic growth rate will be lower. The situation will be reversed if the replacement 
ratio is larger than 0.4. Similarly, there will be biased estimation of the effects of 
replacement ratio on fertility, tax rate and economic growth if fertility is not 
endogenized. 
4. 4 Migration Policy 
In the previous section we show that introducing immigrants can have macroeconomic 
effects. In this section, we examine the impact of migration policy by changing the 
quality and quantity of immigrants. We first increase   from 0.02 to 0.18 to study 
how it affects the economic performance.  
<Figure 6 is inserted about here> 
Figure 6a indicates that when the government introduces more immigrants into 
the economy (an increase in  ), there will be more workers sharing the social security 
burden and the tax rate will become lower. Figure 6b presents fertility and the ratio of 
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educational investment to labor income for different types of agents in an economy 
with migration and for agents in a closed economy. With a higher after-tax wage rate, 
the opportunity cost of rearing children becomes higher, so for both types of agents the 
fertility rate declines and the ratio of educational expenditure to labor income increases 
with an increase in  . Thus, the average fertility will decrease while the average ratio 
of educational expenditure to labor income will increase.  
Changes in   will affect the economic growth through two channels. On one 
hand, the increase in   will raise the proportion of educational investment to labor 
income. On the other hand, an increase in   implies an increase in the proportion of 
low-skilled adults to the total adult population, and this lowers the average human 
capital. Our numerical results show that if   is small, the latter will dominate the 
former and the economic growth rate will decrease with an increase in the flow of 
immigrants. However, the situation will be reversed is   is sufficiently large.  
Numerical Result 3.  A rise in the flow of low-skilled immigrants will lower the social 
security tax rate. It will reduce the average fertility and raise the average ratio of 
educational expenditure to labor income. The relationship between economic growth 
rate and flow of immigrants exhibits a U-shape. 
In our baseline model, we assume that immigrants have a lower level of human 
capital than natives. We now allow   to vary from 0.5 to 1.3 to examine how the level 
of human capital of immigrations affects economic performance. The results are 
presented in Figure 7. Changes in   will affect fertility in two ways. When 
immigrants (as well as the type-2 agents) are better-educated, they will choose to have 
fewer children (direct effect). However, changes in   will also affect the fertility 
choice for type-1 agents as indicated by Eq. (31) (indirect effect). This is because as 
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type-2 agents become better-educated, their labor income will increase and they will 
save more. Both investment and the average human capital will increase, so economic 
growth will increase. This will raise the future social security payments and the 
expected life-time income for type-1 agents. Thus, the fertility for type-1 agents will 
increase with an increase in   as exhibited in Figure 7b.  
Figure 7a shows that when 1  (immigrants are low-skilled workers), the direct 
effect dominates the indirect effect and the average fertility decreases as   increases. 
Hence, there will be fewer young people sharing the social security burden in the next 
generation, and the tax rate will increase with  . Because of lower after-tax income, 
the average ratio of educational investment to labor income will decrease. Although 
the decrease in educational expenditure will retard economic growth, more educated 
immigrants will raise average human capital and will increase economic growth. Our 
numerical exercise indicates that the economic growth will increase with  . 
<Figure 7 is inserted about here> 
If immigrants are high-skilled workers ( 1 ), an increase in   will raise the 
average fertility and the average ratio of educational expenditure to labor income and 
will lower the tax rate. Both increases in   and average human capital increase growth. 
Hence, economic growth will increase as   increases. 
Numerical Result 4.  If immigrants are low-skilled workers, an increase in the level of 
human capital of immigrants will reduce the average fertility and the average ratio of 
educational investment to labor income and will increase the tax rate. The situation will 
be reversed if immigrants are high-skilled workers. However, no matter which type 
immigrants are, an increase in the level of human capital of immigrants tends to increase 
the economic growth rate. 
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4.5 Convergence of Human Capital 
In Section 3, we show that there always exist two types of agents and the ratio of 
human capital levels for agents of native dynasties to agents of immigrant dynasties 
remains constant forever. However, the estimation of Borjas (1994) indicates that it 
takes approximately 100 years for the human capital level of agents belonging to 
immigrant dynasties to converge to the level of agents belong to native dynasties. In 
order to capture the idea of the convergence of human capital, we now extend our 
basic model by assuming that human capital accumulation also depends on the average 
human capital. That is: 
      11 )()( ittitit hHeBh ,                                    (34) 
where )1,0(  is the elasticity of children’s human capital with respect to the average 
human capital. 
We assume that before period 1, the economy is closed and comprised by 
homogenous agents. We refer these agents and their descendants as the type-1 agents. 
At the beginning of period 1, the economy opens for international migration and 
introduces immigrants possessing human capital level as a constant fraction ( ) of 
type-1 agents. Due to the setting of log-utility function, the first-order conditions of 
consumption, fertility and educational investment are the same as those in Section 3. 
Then the human capital of the children of natives and immigrants will be: 
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 . 
Besides, the immigrants in period 2 will possess human capital of the level of 12h . 
Therefore, there will be three types of agents living in period 2: agents whose 
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ancestors are natives in period 1 possess human capital ݄ଶଵ, agents whose ancestors are 
immigrants in period 1 possess human capital ߜଵିఉ݄ଶଵ and agents who just immigrate 
into the economy possess human capital ߜ݄ଶଵ.  
As one can see, the types of agents will increase as time goes by. Comparing 
these results with those obtained in our basic model, the major difference is that in 
period t, there only exist two types of agents with human capital of ݄௧ଵ and ߜ݄௧ଵ in the 
basic model while there exist (t+1) types of agents with human capital of ݄௧ଵ , 
ߜሺଵିఉሻ౪షభ݄௧ଵ ,…, ߜଵିఉ݄௧ଵ  and ߜ݄௧ଵ  in the current model. Our previous analysis has 
demonstrated that fertility decreases with an increase in the level of human capital. 
Thus, the average fertility will be lower in the current model than in our basic model if 
immigrants possess lower human capital than type-1 agents (that is, ߜ ൏ 1).11 If the 
purpose to introduce lower-human-capital immigrants into the economy is to increase 
future population to share the tax burden of social security, then it will cause a smaller 
reduction in tax in the current model than in the basic model due to the lower average 
fertility. 
To examine the speed of convergence, notice that after 4 periods (approximate 
120 years), there will be 5 types of agents with human capital of ݄ସଵ, ߜ݄ସଵ, ߜଵିఉ݄ସଵ, 
ߜሺଵିఉሻమ݄ସଵ and ߜሺଵିఉሻయ݄ସଵ. Two important determinants to the speed of convergence of 
human capital of descendants of immigrants are ߜ and ߚ. Note that we have calibrated 
ߜ  to 0.94. The empirical study finds that comparing with the elasticity of private 
educational investment, the elasticity of average human capital is relatively smaller. 
Based on the estimation of Card and Krueger (1996) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001), 
de la Croix and Doepke (2003) set ߚ to 0.1 to conduct numerical exercises. The ratio 
of human capital of the descendants of immigrants who moved into the country 120 
                                                 
11  Because ߚ א ሺ0,1ሻ and ߜ א ሺ0,1ሻ, then ߜሺଵିఉሻ౪షభ ൐ ߜሺଵିఉሻ౪షమ ൐ ڮ ൐ ߜ. 
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years ago to the human capital of the descendants of natives is ߜሺଵିఉሻయ. By assigning 
ߜ ൌ 0.94 and ߚ ൌ 0.1, this ratio equals 0.95. It is easy to verify that the speed of 
convergence of human capital increases as ߜ or ߚ increases.12 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study presents an analysis of the impact of introducing immigration on economic 
performance in an overlapping-generations model with uncertain lifetime and a social 
security system. Our analysis shows that introducing immigrants into the economy can 
help reduce the social security burden. If the gap in human capital between immigrants 
and natives is not too large and the flow of immigrants is small, the growth rate in an 
economy with migration will be higher than that in a closed economy when life 
expectancy (or the replacement ratio) is sufficiently high.  
Concerning migration polices, we find that there is a U-shape relationship 
between the economic growth rate and the flow of immigrants. Although increasing 
the flow of immigrants can reduce the tax burden of social security, it is not necessary 
good for economic growth. On the other hand, increasing the quality of immigrants is 
beneficial for economic growth, but it raises the tax burden of social security if 
immigrants are low-skilled workers. 
A few notes are worth discussing. First, throughout the paper, we focus on the 
effects of legal immigration. If we also consider illegal immigration into the analysis, 
then migration may help reduce the tax burden of social security even more. This is 
because illegal immigrants are not eligible for social security, but their children who 
are considered to be natives will participate in the social security program and need to 
share the burden of social security. Second, we use a simple three-period OLG model 
in this paper to study how immigration affects the burden of social security through the 
                                                 
12  For example, if ߚ increases to 0.3, then ߜሺଵିఉሻయ will equal 0.98. 
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channel of fertility. It would be more interesting if we study this issue by extending the 
model to a life-cycle model with more periods of life (e.g., a period length of at most 5 
years). A life-cycle model will allow us to study the effects of a particular immigration 
policy which allows certain ages and skills of workers to immigrate on the social 
security burden for the host country. 
We conclude by suggesting two possible directions in which our model can be 
easily extended and applied. First, we assume that all immigrants can stay in the host 
country permanently. It would be interesting to extend the model to study the effects of 
temporary immigrants. Secondly, our model ignores the social costs of introducing 
immigrants such as cultural conflict. Adding such costs may reduce economic growth 
and social welfare. 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Proposition 1   
We first prove that there exists a unique equilibrium. Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (21), 
we have:  
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        )1)(1()]1()1)(1([)1()( 2   panqpanpqnf ttt .  
The optimal solution(s) of fertility can be calculated by solving 0)( tnf . Note that: 
   0)1)(1()1(4)]1()1)(1([ 2   papqqpa . 
Since )( tnf  is a quadratic function, 0  indicates that there exist two real 
solutions for 0)( tnf . Furthermore, the product of these two solutions is negative. 
This implies that there exists a unique positive, constant solution of tn  ( nnt   t ). 
Then from Eqs. (3) and (18), we know that labor input and the tax rate are also 
constant ( llt  ,  t  t ). Substituting the constant fertility rate and tax rate into 
Eqs. (12), (13), (15), (19) and (20), we can calculate the unique solutions of tc , 1td , 
te , ts  and 1tM . 
We next show the existence of balanced growth path. Along the BGP equilibrium, 
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
t
t
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k
 is stationary along the BGP equilibrium. 
Combining Eqs. (1), (10) and (15), we can derive: 
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Combining Eqs. (10), (16), (20) and (21), we can calculate: 
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Using the property that Eqs. (A2) and (A3) are equal, the stationary variable  

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Substituting Eq. (A4) into Eq. (A2) gives us the growth factor: 
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QED. 
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Appendix 2 
Proof of Proposition 2   
From Eq. (A1), we can derive the impact of the replacement ratio on fertility: 
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From Eq. (22), we can derive the impact of the replacement ratio on  :  
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Using Eqs. (18), (21) and (A6), we know that 0)1()1( 
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Note that the inequality (A7) holds if 
  1 . Then according Eq. (A6), 
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The derivative of the growth factor respect to the replacement ratio is: 
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QED. 
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Appendix 3 
Proof of Proposition 3   
From Eq. (A1), we can derive the impact of p  on fertility: 
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From Eq. (22), we can derive the impact of p  on  :  
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The partial derivative of the growth factor respect to the replacement ratio is: 
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Table 1  Numerical results 
 ݌ ൌ 0.6, ܽ ൌ 0.4 ݌ ൌ 1, ܽ ൌ 0.4 ݌ ൌ 0.6, ܽ ൌ 0.9 
 Closed  Open Closed Open Closed Open 
Avg. fertility 1.0704  1.0689  0.9997  0.9975  1.1416  1.1398 
Avg. edu. (%) 3.4656  3.4830  2.6465  2.6761  2.3844  2.4222 
Tax rate (%) 22.4218 22.0122 40.0109 39.3141 47.3041 46.4499 
Growth rate (%) 2.0000  1.9978  1.8398 1.8435  1.5716  1.5798 
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Figure 1a  Life expectancy 
 
Figure 1b  The percentage of pension expenditure to GDP 
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Figure 2  Effect of life expectancy on economic performance  
 
Figure 3  Effect of replacement ratio on economic performance  
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Figure 4 Effect of life expectancy for exogenous fertility and endogenous fertility 
 
Figure 5 Effect of replacement ratio for exogenous fertility and endogenous fertility 
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Figure 6a   
 
Figure 6b 
Figure 6  Effect of the number of immigrants 
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Figure 7a 
 
Figure 7b  
Figure 7  Effect of immigrants’ human capital 
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